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Humans are believed to be equipped with an Approximate Number System (ANS) that
supports non-symbolic representations of numerical magnitude. Correlations between
individual measures of the precision of the ANS and mathematical ability have raised
the question of whether the precision can be improved by feedback training. A study
(DeWind and Brannon, 2012) reported improvement in discrimination precision occurring
within 600–700 trials of feedback, suggesting ANS malleability with rapidly improving
acuity in response to feedback. We tried to replicate the rapid improvement in a control
group design, while controlling for the use of perceptual cues. The results indicate no
learning effects, but a minor constant advantage for the feedback group. The measures
of motivation suggest that feedback has a positive effect on motivation and that the
difference in discrimination is due to the greater motivation of participants with feedback.
These results suggest that at least for adults the number sense may not respond to
feedback in the short-term.
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INTRODUCTION
Non-symbolic representation of numerical magnitudes is an abil-
ity shared by human adults, infants, and non-human animals
(Feigenson et al., 2004). The Approximate Number System (ANS)
claimed to support this ability is thought to represent numbers
in an analog and approximate fashion with increasingly impre-
cise representations with increasing numerosity (Dehaene, 2008;
but see, Brannon et al., 2001). The acuity of the ANS, conceptual-
ized as the smallest numerical change that can be reliably detected,
is often quantified by a Weber fraction (w). Recent studies show
that there is a substantial individual variability in acuity of the
ANS (w:s for adults often lie in the range 0.1–0.45, see e.g., Pica
et al., 2004; Halberda and Feigenson, 2008; Halberda et al., 2008;
Tokita and Ishiguchi, 2010), and that the acuity improves from
childhood to adolescence (Halberda and Feigenson, 2008).
Brain-imaging studies have indicated that the ANS has a neu-
rological basis in the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) on the lateral
surface of the parietal lobe (Castelli et al., 2006; Piazza et al., 2006)
and studies on macaque monkeys have even found specialized
neurons (numerons) within the IPS that are sensitive to numeros-
ity (Nieder et al., 2002). The IPS is activated when people attend
to or compare the number of objects in a set, when they observe
numbers in different modalities, and when they perform sim-
ple arithmetic tasks (Piazza et al., 2004; Piazza and Izard, 2009)
suggesting that the ANS is supramodal and independent of per-
ceptual variables. Further support for this was found in a recent
study using single-cell recordings in the primate brain (Nieder,
2012a). It was shown that there are neurons that encode numeros-
ity irrespective of stimulus modality (visual/auditive) (see Nieder,
2012b for a review of the physiology of “number neurons”).
Halberda et al. (2008) demonstrated that a relationship
between ANS acuity and formal mathematics achievement exists
when controlling for a set of cognitive abilities. Further, chil-
dren with dyscalculia have been shown to suffer from an
ANS-impairment (Piazza et al., 2010; Mazzocco et al., 2011) high-
lighting the question of whether it is possible to improve the
acuity of the ANS with training. It is possible that the associa-
tion between the precision of the ANS and mathematical ability
exists because the ANS lays the foundation for higher-level arith-
metical concepts. This remains yet to be shown, but the finding
that it is possible to improve the functioning of this system would
have tremendous applied and clinical impact should such a causal
link be established.
MEASURING TRAINING EFFECTS ON ANS ACUITY
If empirical studies show that participants improve in their dis-
crimination of numerosities after presentation of feedback, this
effect could in principle be due to at least four different and
independent explanations (or a combination of any of these):
(1) the improvement (e.g., in terms of lower w:s) may be due
to practice in regard to more superficial attentional and proce-
dural aspects of the task, such as learning how to best attend
to the stimuli, to decrease error when responding, etc.; (2) the
feedback may have a motivational effect on the participants’ per-
formance, making them try harder. These first two explanations
can be regarded as relatively superficial in the sense that they
are not related intrinsically to numerosity discrimination, but
apply, potentially, to any task content; (3) the participants may
improve or shift their strategies in the use of indirect percep-
tual cues for numerosity, so that they use them more efficiently.
They might, for example, learn to weight the cues in a more
optimal way to arrive at more accurate estimates of numerosity.
The ANS, as described above, involves an abstract representation
independent of perceptual variables. However, several settings
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have shown the interference of lower level perceptual variables
such as element-size or density (Tokita and Ishiguchi, 2010)
and there are accounts that reject the idea of an ANS alto-
gether on these grounds, proposing that the judgments stem from
weighting of multiple visual cues (Gebuis and Reynvoet, 2012);
(4) the feedback may truly “sharpen” an abstract but malleable
ANS, improving its acuity by experience-dependent functional
plasticity through enhanced selectivity in neurons that repre-
sent numerosity. Most studies on training of the ANS have had
the aim to demonstrate the last of these four explanations. The
unambiguous demonstration of a sharpening of an abstract ANS,
while excluding the other three possible explanations, would
indeed be a highly interesting observation from a psychological
perspective.
To exclude explanation 1 above, a control group that performs
the task without feedback is needed1. Surprisingly, there seem
to be no studies that have used a control group as a compari-
son. A motivational explanation may be probed for by obtaining
self-ratings of motivation. Spontaneous verbal reports from pilot
participants have indicated that a number of them found the
task much more interesting and engaging when receiving feed-
back (see e.g., Kluger and DeNisi, 1996, for a review of how
feedback influences motivation). No previous studies have inves-
tigated the motivational effects on numerosity discrimination or
controlled for the motivational effects of introducing feedback in
such discrimination tasks.
The participants may use perceptual cues rather than
numerosity to solve non-symbolic discrimination tasks, and it
may be practically impossible to completely rule out the possi-
bility that they fully or partially do so (Gebuis and Reynvoet,
2012). However, any study aiming to make the claim that the ANS
is highly malleable (when the ANS is considered a fundamen-
tally abstract representation independent of perceptual variables),
can make a strong case for this conclusion only if the stimuli
are arranged so as not to promote the use of the salient per-
ceptual cues and if it can be convincingly demonstrated that
the positive effect of feedback is not mediated by a shift in the
use of these salient perceptual cues. This means that the perfor-
mance should improve for all stimuli, irrespective of perceptual
arrangement.
In sum: regardless of whether numerosity discrimination
involves an ANS or the weighting of indirect perceptual cues, a
positive training effect on numerosity discrimination is primarily
of interest if the two first explanations are controlled for (being
familiarized with the attentional and procedural demands of the
task or by increased motivation). If one, in addition, wants to
claim an improvement in the acuity of an abstract ANS, one needs
to try to rule out in a convincing way, that the effect is mediated
by a shift in the use of perceptual cues.
1While at least in theory one cannot exclude the possibility that the ANS may
sharpen spontaneously in the absence of feedback, we find this unlikely and
we know of no study that has reported such a phenomenon. Humans probably
engage in activities that activate the ANS on a daily basis. If the mere use of
the system would lead to its refinement, there would thus seem to be ample
opportunity for high level performance that probably would leave no room
for further improvement by laboratory training.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Results from studies of training on children (e.g., Wilson et al.,
2006a,b, 2009) have been mixed and the lack of control groups
makes it hard to separate the effects on ANS per se from the
other explanations discussed above. Two recent studies on adults
(Tokita and Ishiguchi, 2010; DeWind and Brannon, 2012) have
shown effects of feedback on performance in numerosity judg-
ment tasks. Tokita and Ishiguchi (2010) manipulated perceptual
cues (element size and array area) in a comparative numeros-
ity judgment task and investigated effects of feedback on the
influence of these cues on judgments. They showed that people
initially responded to the perceptual cues but could learn not to
attend to them, with lower w:s as a result. They concluded that
observers could learn to suppress the interference of perceptual
cues or the influence of prior knowledge with practice under feed-
back. DeWind and Brannon (2012) provided participants with
trial-by-trial feedback on six one hour sessions and found imme-
diate effects in terms of improved (lower) w:s that appeared in the
first session and then remained constant.
Both of the studies above show improvement in numerosity
judgments following feedback, but different claims were made by
the authors. The purpose of the Tokita and Ishiguchi (2010) study
was to examine whether people can learn not to attend to per-
ceptual cues that were deliberately introduced in the stimuli. The
authors did not claim that their findings show a sharpening of the
ANS. DeWind and Brannon (2012), however, made the stronger
claim that the ANS is malleable and its acuity rapidly improved
in response to feedback, conveying a positive message about the
possibility of rapid enhancement of the ANS with feedback. The
interpretation of the results is not clear-cut, however.
First, the study lacks a control group, leaving the possibility
that the observed improvement may be due to superficial practice
effects rather than a true effect of malleability of the ANS. Second,
the presence of strong perceptual cue reliance in the study may be
problematic. To control for perceptual cues DeWind and Brannon
used three types of stimuli. The cumulative area of the dots was
either larger for the more numerous set of dots (congruent),
smaller for the more numerous set (incongruent) or constant for
both sets. This arrangement of stimuli has the unfortunate con-
sequence of confounding perceptual variables with numerosity in
that the less numerous sets have a larger dot-size on 2/3 of the
trials. The results indeed indicated that the overall use of cumula-
tive area as a cue to number decreased and that this decrease was
parallel to the improvement of w:s.
It was shown that whereas participants in the first session
performed better on congruent trials, by the last session perfor-
mance was better on incongruent trials, an effect that was sta-
tistically significant when excluding outliers. Thus, participants
seem to have shifted from one perceptual strategy (cumulative
area) to another (size). When analyzed separately, performance
did indeed improve for trials where cumulative area was held
constant. However, as suggested by the results for congruent and
incongruent trials, it could be that participants relied on dot-size
rather than cumulative area. This interpretation is reasonable,
because, again, dot-size was confounded with numerosity and
previous research indicates that people are influenced by dot-
size when judging numerosity (Krueger, 1984; Vos et al., 1988;
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Shuman and Spelke, 2006). To substantiate the suspicion that
perceptual cues were a significant factor in the above study we
performed additional analyses on the data from the study2. The
malleability hypothesis as an explanation of the data in terms
of an improvement in a perceptual independent number sys-
tem implies that participants generally should improve in their
performance for all items, irrespective of the perceptual con-
stellation. If participants on the other hand improved because
they learned to pick up the perceptual cues, we would expect a
different pattern for different stimuli. More specifically, if partic-
ipants picked up the confound of dot-size and numerosity and
responded to this, we would, depending on the degree to which
they rely on these cues expect impaired improvement, or even a
decrease in performance for congruent trials, for which this cue
is misleading. This stimulus set was never analyzed separately in
the original study. An analysis of performance proportion cor-
rect (PC) on congruent trials indeed shows that not only does
performance fail to improve, but actually quite drastically drops
for these stimuli, from 0.79 in the pre-test to 0.69 in the post-
test. The deterioration is almost twice as large as the overall
improvement reported by DeWind and Brannon with all stim-
uli included, and highly statistically significant [F(1, 18) = 10.3,
p < 0.005]. Thus, 4 days of training with feedback has the effect of
making participants worse at discriminating between numerosi-
ties when the more numerous set has a larger dot-size than the
less numerous. This analysis thus substantiates the suspicion that
perceptual cues are a key factor behind the results of DeWind and
Brannon.
To exclude the explanation that participants shift their strate-
gies in attending to perceptual cues, learning need to be demon-
strated in a setting where the stimuli is arranged so as not to
promote the use of perceptual cues and where it can be demon-
strated that the participants do not, at least primarily, rely on the
salient perceptual cues.
We use a numerosity task closely based on the one designed
by Halberda and colleagues (2006, 2008; see the method section
below) which controls for cumulative area on half the trials and
average dot-size on the other half of the trials. (With spatially
overlapping sets and random dot placement, area-controlled tri-
als also control for other continuous perceptual variables such
as total dot density, inter-dot distance and total envelope set
size.) With this procedure, several studies (see e.g., Cantlon and
Brannon, 2006, 2007; Halberda and Feigenson, 2008; Halberda
et al., 2006, 2008; Mazzocco et al., 2011) have suggested that par-
ticipants do rely on numerosity rather than on perceptual cues.
This has also been confirmed on a large number of participants
in our lab. This procedure has two benefits with respect to the
evaluation of explanation three as discussed above. First, because
area and size controlled trials are presented intermixed in an
individually randomized order, the task does not invite the use
of perceptual cues. Second, if participants nevertheless use per-
ceptual cues instead of numerosity, and change in the way they
use such cues when feedback is introduced, it will be possible to
evaluate this in post hoc statistical tests.
2We are most grateful to Nicholas DeWind for providing the original data that
allowed for these analyses.
In sum: Tokita and Ishiguchi (2010) demonstrated that the
participants can learn from feedback to suppress perceptual
cues. There are indications of ANS malleability in the results in
DeWind and Brannon (2012), but it remains unclear if these
effects are explained by more superficial practice effects, percep-
tual strategies or effects on motivation of introducing feedback.
THE PRESENT STUDY
The purpose of the present study accordingly was to replicate the
rapid learning reported by DeWind and Brannon (2012) in a con-
trol group design and with a task that does not promote use of
perceptual cues, and where it can be detected if a positive training
effect is mediated by a shift in the use of these perceptual cues.
Motivational factors will be controlled for by obtaining self-rated
motivation scores.
ANS malleability predicts a pattern of data with a gradual
improvement in the numerosity discriminations in the exper-
imental group accompanied by a lack of improvement in the
control group. Superficial practice effect predicts a pattern of data
where both the control and experimental group improve to a sim-
ilar degree. A motivational effect of feedback predicts that the
experimental group will perform at higher levels than the con-
trol group once that feedback is provided, presumably with an
abrupt improvement in the performance when the feedback is
introduced, rather than as an incremental function. The finding
that effects remain when, after a training period feedback is sud-
denly withheld would not exclude this possibility. It could be, for
example, that the withdrawal of feedback itself signals that a final
test of learning will take place that sustains high motivation per
se. The perceptual cues will be probed for by undertaking separate
analyses for size-controlled vs. area-controlled stimulus presenta-
tions. If the participants learn to pick-up these perceptual cues,
we expect a pattern of results where the differences in the perfor-
mance on these stimulus types turn up in the experimental group,
but not in the control group.
The performance in number discrimination tasks might be
related to a more general ability to process visual stimuli rapidly,
so called mental speed (Deary and Stough, 1996). To investi-
gate the relationship between ANS acuity and mental speed we
therefore included an inspection time test. The ANS is consid-
ered a fundamental core cognitive ability withmodular properties
and should thereby possibly be inaccessible to meta-cognitive
monitoring and conscious thought (Mandelbaum, 2013). While
there are several types of meta-cognitive monitoring (Merkle and
Weber, 2011) we were interested in participants’ ability to com-
pare their own performance with the performance of others.
Therefore, the participants were asked to rate their own perfor-
mance in the ANS and inspection time tasks relative to the other
participants in the study.
We focus on the region of feedback trials where DeWind and
Brannon (2012) observed the effects (these occurred after 648
trials, with no further improvement of an extra 2500 trials)3. We
used the same exposure time, the same type of stimuli, the same
3In limiting our study to this amount of feedback, we of course acknowledge
that more substantial training might have effects above what is found in this
study.
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(spatially intermixed) presentation method, similar stimulus
ratios and a sample of participants of age and background com-
parable to DeWind and Brannon (2012)4. Thus, in all important
aspects the present study is a replication of the DeWind and
Brannon (2012) study but with alterations to control for practice
effects, reliance on perceptual cues, and motivational effects.
METHOD
Participants (9 Male, 31 Female) were undergraduate students
from Uppsala University with a mean age of 25.4 years (SD =
5.7)5. All participants gave informed consent to participate.
The task, based on Halberda et al. (2008), had a pre-test, a
training block, and a post-test consisting of 200, 1000, and 100
trials, respectively. On each trial, participants saw spatially inter-
mixed blue and yellow dots on a monitor. Exposure time (200ms)
was too short for the dots to be serially counted. We used five
ratios between the two sets of dots (1:2, 3:4, 5:6, 7:8, 9:10) with the
total number of dots varying between 11 and 30. One 5th of the
trials consisted of each ratio. Half of the trials had blue and half
had yellow as the more numerous set. The dots varied randomly
in size. To counteract the use of perceptual cues we matched dot
arrays either for total area or for average dot-size. The participants
judged which set was more numerous by pressing a color-coded
keyboard button.
In training, participants (n = 20) in the feedback condition
received immediate “correct/wrong” feedback on their judgment
while participants (n = 20) in the control condition did not. The
feedback was presented with the words “correct” and “wrong,”
written in green and red respectively, in close proximity to the
dot stimulus. Both groups were instructed to try to improve, and
achieve as many correct answers as possible. Participants carried
out all 1300 trials of the experiment in a single session, lasting
approximately 120min, with the possibility to take breaks after
each block of 200 trials.
After the post-test block, participants rated their own moti-
vation during the test on a 1 (very low motivation) to 5 (very
high motivation) scale and performed a visual inspection time
task, based on Deary et al. (2004) that measures perceptual speed.
The inspection time task is a two-alternative forced-choice visual
backward masked task in which the participants are exposed to
two parallel lines of different lengths, the ratio of which is held
constant for all trials, and are to decide which is longer. The line
stimulus are presented with one of five presentation times (25,
40, 60, 80, 100ms) with one 5th of the trials from each presen-
tation time. Participants rated their own performance relative to
the other participants by estimating the percentage of partici-
pants with a lower percentage correct than themselves for both the
ANS acuity task and the inspection time task (i.e., their percentile
rank).
4DeWind and Brannon used a prolonged training period spread out over days.
However, all effects where obtained during the first feedback session which
occurred at one single occasion. Thus, it is not possible that their results are
due to effects of feedback that are measurable only after a consolidation (i.e.,
overnight) period that would not turn up in the present study.
5One participant in the feedback condition who performed at chance levels
was excluded. An additional participant performing below chance levels in the
inspection time task was excluded from analyses involving inspection time.
MODELING OF ANS ACUITY
We used a classical psychophysics model that relies on a lin-
ear form of the ANS, to model performance in the ANS acuity
task. Earlier work (e.g., Halberda et al., 2008) has shown this
to be a plausible model of performance in numerical discrim-
ination tasks. Percentage correct was modeled as a function of
increasing ratio between the two sets of blue and yellow dots
[larger sample (n1)/smaller sample (n2)]. The two sets are rep-
resented as Gaussian random variables with means n1 and n2 and
standard deviations w · n1 and w · n2, respectively. Subtracting
the Gaussian for the smaller set from that for the larger set
returns a new Gaussian with mean n2 − n1 and standard devi-
ation w
√
n21 + n22. Percentage correct is then equal to 1—error
rate, where error rate is defined as the area under the tail of the
resulting normal curve computed as:
1
2
erfc
⎛
⎝ |n1 − n2|√
2w
√
n21 + n22
⎞
⎠ , (1)
where erfc is the complementary error function. This fits per-
centage correct in the ANS acuity task as a function of the
Gaussian approximate number representation for the two sets
of dots with w as a single free parameter. The individual w
obtained describes the standard deviations for the Gaussian
representation of the ANS acuity, describing how much the
two Gaussian representations overlap and predicting an indi-
vidual’s percentage correct on a numerical discrimination task.
We used this model to find the best fit for each individ-
ual for the pre-test, training, post-test blocks, thus obtaining
individual w:s.
RESULTS
Performance, for both w and PC, for each part of the experiment
(pre-test, training, and post-test) and for the control and feedback
conditions separately is summarized in Table 1. The table also
includes p-values for tests of the difference (independent t-tests)
in performance between the two groups for each part respectively.
(The effect of feedback, in terms of Cohen’s d for the difference in
PC reported in the DeWind and Brannon (2012) between per-
formance in the control and at training session 1 was 1.21. With
our between subjects design, an alpha-level of 0.05 and a two-
tailed test (i.e., those reported in Table 1), we have a power of 0.98
to detect an effect of the corresponding size. Thus, the present
study has a very high power of detecting an effect at least as large
as that previously observed.) Performance was marginally better
in the feedback than in the control group in all parts except the
pre-test, but there were no signs of learning during the training.
The improvement in the feedback group occurred immediately
when feedback appeared. Figure 1 shows the data from the train-
ing block separated into 10 sub-blocks of 100 trials, together with
the data from pre- and post-tests, in order to examine the possi-
bility of a modest initial learning effect that quickly levels out. PC,
rather than w, is used in the figure to depict performance.
It is clear that there is no learning in either group, but that
the feedback group has a slight advantage already at the moment
when feedback is introduced. If anything, the figure indicates
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Table 1 | Performance, both as w and PC, in each part of the
experiment (pre-test, training, post-test) and the Pcue index for the
control and feedback conditions respectively.
Condition
Control Feedback
Block Measure M SD M SD p-valuea
Pre PC 0.75 0.05 0.75 0.04 0.83
w 0.24 0.05 0.24 0.07 0.80
Pcue 0.00 0.06 −0.01 0.07 0.40
Training PC 0.75 0.03 0.77 0.04 0.07
w 0.23 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.12
Pcue 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.68
Post PC 0.76 0.06 0.79 0.05 0.11
w 0.24 0.10 0.19 0.06 0.08
Pcue 0.00 0.12 −0.01 0.07 0.60
ap-values are for independent t-tests for the difference between the two groups
for each performance measure in each part of the experiment (A positive score
for the Pcue index indicates superior performance on area-controlled stimuli).
FIGURE 1 | Performance (proportion correct) in the ANS acuity task as
a function of training block and condition during 1000 trials of training.
The figure also includes performance in pre- and post-tests. Vertical bars
denote 95% confidence intervals.
that the difference in PC between the two groups decreases with
training. We calculated PC scores and w for each participant
for each training block of 100 trials. We then fitted a regression
model to individual PC scores and w with regressors for train-
ing block number and participant. We found that participants
did not improve with training in neither the feedback condition
(PC: b = −0.002, p = 0.19, R2 = 0.05; w: b = 0.002, p = 0.29,
R2 = 0.05), nor in the control condition (PC: b = 0.0003, p =
0.78, R2 = 0.002; w: b = 0.0005, p = 0.79, R2 = 0.0004). Thus,
there is no sign of learning in either group, and in the feed-
back condition the sign of b is even negative for PC and positive
for w, suggesting, if anything, a deterioration rather than an
improvement of performance. There is a possibility that learn-
ing effects are so rapid that they would occur even within the
first 100 trials of learning and thus not be detectable in Figure 1.
Although this seems a priori implausible we undertook an even
more fine-grained analysis of data from the first learning block.
We found no effects on PC [with 10 trials the fitting of w is
unfeasible (Mazzocco et al., 2011)] indicating the presence of
such extremely rapid learning with the same analyses undertaken
on this subset of data (feedback: b = 0.001, p = 0.68, R2 = 0.00;
control: b = 0.00, p = 0.95, R2 = 0.00, with the first learning
block divided into sub-blocks of 10 trials).
The results suggest an effect of feedback on motivation rather
than on learning. The correlation between motivation and overall
performance after feedback was introduced was significant both
for PC [r(37) = 0.37, p = 0.019] and for w [r(37) = −0.40, p =
0.012], confirming this suspicion. A One-Way ANOVA revealed
that feedback had a strong effect on self-rated motivation, which
was higher in the feedback group (M = 4.2, SD = 0.4) than in the
control group (M = 3.2, SD = 0.8), [F(1, 37) = 20, p < 0.001].
The average performance on all trials after introduction of feed-
back is significantly better in the feedback condition (PC: M =
0.78, SD = 0.03; w: M = 0.20, SD = 0.05) than in the control
condition (PC: M = 0.76, SD = 0.03; w : M = 0.24, SD = 0.06)
[PC: F(1, 37) = 4.2, p = 0.047; w: F(1, 37) = 4.2, p = 0.048]. We
conducted a GLM ANCOVA on PC, with motivation as covari-
ate and test part (pre-test, training, post-test) and condition
(control/feedback) as independent variables, to investigate par-
ticipants’ performance in the two conditions when equating their
level of motivation. The GLM ANCOVA adjusts the means in the
two conditions with respect to motivation and adjusts the inde-
pendent variable for interactions with the covariate. The adjusted
means in the control (M = 0.762, SEM = 0.009) and feedback
(M = 0.764, SEM = 0.009) conditions were very similar and the
effect of feedback was not significant [F(1, 36) < 1]. We interpret
this finding to signify that feedback has little or no effect on
performance above an indirect effect through motivation (The
size of this motivational effect in terms of PC is modest; feed-
back condition, MdnPC = 0.79, [0.69 – 0.86]; control condition
MdnPC = 0.77, [0.64 – 0.87].).
To control for the use of cumulative area/average dot-size as
perceptual cues, half of the trials were cumulative area controlled
whereas the other half was controlled for dot-size. To establish
whether participants use these cues, a Pcue index was calculated
by subtracting performance on trials where cumulative area was
controlled for from performance on trials where average dot-size
was held constant. This index (presented in Table 1) was close
to zero before, during, and after onset of feedback and not sig-
nificantly different between the control and feedback group at
any test. It is possible that participants are heterogeneous, some
using cumulative area as a cue whereas others rely on size. This
will lead to some participants scoring better for area controlled
stimuli and others scoring better for size-controlled stimuli, and
would turn up as an increase in variance of the differences of the
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scores for these both item-types (i.e., analogous to the “rectified
index” used by DeWind and Brannon). To test for this possibil-
ity we compared the variances of the difference in PC for the
two item-types (area/size controlled) between the control group
and the experimental group with F-ratio variance tests. Variances
were highly comparable throughout the entire training phase and
when comparing the conditions no F-ratio test revealed a statis-
tically significant effect. Thus, although we cannot fully exclude
the possibility that participants used perceptual cues, we have no
indications that they did.
The correlation between accuracy in the inspection time task
and overall performance in the ANS task, when controlling for
motivation, [PC: r(36) = 0.39, p = 0.02; w: r(36) = −0.47, p =
0.003] was significant, with better performance in the inspec-
tion time task related to better ANS acuity (higher PC/lower w).
In the previous correlation and those reported below motivation
was partialled out because motivation had an effect on PC and
w. To investigate to what degree participants had insight in their
performance we correlated estimated percentile rank with actual
percentile rank for both the ANS acuity task (both w and PC)
and the inspection time task. Neither the correlation for ANS
acuity [PC: r(37) = 0.23, p = 0.17; w: r(37) = 0.18, p = 0.27] nor
inspection time [r(36) = 0.05, p = 0.77] was significant (partial
correlations controlling for motivation in both tests). For ANS
acuity, participants rated themselves slightly, but not significantly,
below the median [49th percentile: t(38) = 0.18, p = 0.86]. For
inspection time, the average rated percentile was 33. This under-
estimation of the participants’ own performance was statistically
significant [t(37) = 3.2, p = 0.003].
DISCUSSION
Recent research on children (e.g., Wilson et al., 2006b, 2009;
Mazzocco et al., 2011) and adults (Tokita and Ishiguchi, 2010;
DeWind and Brannon, 2012) has raised the question whether it
is possible to improve ANS acuity by training. Specifically, the
results in DeWind and Brannon (2012) suggest that we should
expect effects on ANS acuity to occur rapidly when feedback is
introduced. However, the lack of control groups, and other fea-
tures in the designs, makes it difficult to separate effects on ANS
acuity per se from task practice effects, perceptual learning, or
motivational effects.
In the present study we investigated the cause of the rapid
effects of feedback on acuity in the ANS using a control group
design and controlling for strong perceptual effects. To account
for motivational effects we also obtained self-rated motivation
scores. Our results showed a small advantage for the feedback
group, but no signs of incremental learning, which suggests the
operation of a motivational effect of introducing feedback rather
than a function of the training with feedback. To our knowledge,
no previous study has shown an effect of motivation on ANS
acuity.
The motivational effect is probably due to the monotonous
task becoming more interesting for participants, when they can
monitor their own performance. It should be noted, though, that
performance in the control condition was stable, indicating that
participants were impressively resistant to fatigue and boredom.
The similarly stable performance in the feedback condition over
the 10 blocks of training also indicates that the lack of a learn-
ing effect is not due to participants becoming fatigued. The ANS
is considered a core cognitive system in which representations
of numerosity are formed automatically (see e.g., Gallistel and
Gelman, 2000). As such it is reasonable to assume that moti-
vation mainly plays a role before (e.g., attention during visual
processing) or after (e.g., when the two representations are com-
pared) the representations of the two sets are formed. While the
present study was not designed to answer the question of at what
stage motivational effects enter, it is certainly an interesting one
for future research. It should be noted that participants in the
DeWind and Brannon study were paid for each correct response.
This procedure would probably reduce an effect of motivation.
However, because all participants received the monetary incentive
and because no measure of motivation was collected any con-
clusions as to the influence of motivation on their subjects are
difficult to make.
The participants in DeWind and Brannon (2012), on average,
improved their w from 0.43 to 0.30 when feedback was intro-
duced. Previous results indicate that w, for adults, is normally
found in the interval 0.1 – 0.45 with a median in the order of
0.25 (Pica et al., 2004; Halberda and Feigenson, 2008; Halberda
et al., 2008; Tokita and Ishiguchi, 2010). Data collected in our own
lab from almost 200 participants (undergraduate students), using
the task based on Halberda et al. (2008) described above, indicate
a population median w of 0.21 [0.11 – 0.43]. Compared to our
data, participants in the study by DeWind and Brannon (2012)
started out with an average in the lowest (poorest) 1st percentile
before training and moved upwards to the lowest 11th percentile
after training. Thus, whatever participants in that study may have
learned, they did not show signs of exceptional ANS acuity after
training, but performed in fact at very low levels compared to
other studies. Undoubtedly, differences in stimuli may account
for some of this performance discrepancy and some previous
studies (Price et al., 2012) indicate that comparisons of abso-
lute levels of w between tasks and studies should be made with
caution. However, given the similarity of tasks, with simultane-
ously presented spatially intermixed dots and the same exposure
time performance could be expected to be more comparable.
Rather than signaling an impressive effect of feedback on ANS
acuity this seems to indicate that participants may have learned to
ignore misleading perceptual cues to achieve the improvement in
numerosity discrimination.
While it is important for researchers to be aware of percep-
tual cues, we fear that exaggerated measures to minimize their use
may be counterproductive. More specifically, creating stimuli in a
Stroop-like fashion with perfect positive (congruent stimuli) or
perfect negative (incongruent stimuli) correlation between a per-
ceptual cue and numerosity possibly makes perceptual cues more
salient. This, in turn, may induce a large number of participants,
who otherwise would not have done so, to rely on them (see e.g.,
Inglis et al., 2011 where a substantial proportion of participants
had to be excluded from the analysis due to suspected use of per-
ceptual cues). Undoubtedly, if participants are encouraged to rely
on perceptual cues they can learn to do so. The procedure of cre-
ating congruent and incongruent stimuli should not be confused
with a control procedure where each trial controls for a separate
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perceptual cue. Such a procedure makes the correlation between
a specific cue and numerosity zero on controlled trials and well
below one on uncontrolled trials. In effect, the control procedure
makes the controlled for perceptual cues very poor predictors for
numerosity.
The correlations between performance in the inspection time
task and the ANS acuity task suggest that ANS acuity is possibly
related to the more general ability to quickly perceive and dis-
criminate between perceptual stimuli. Several studies have shown
correlations between inspection time and psychometric intelli-
gence (see e.g., Deary and Stough, 1996), which opens for the
possibility that the ANS-Inspection time correlation alternatively
may be due to ANS being more generally related to cognitive
functioning, rather than the more specific ability it has been
thought to be6. The significant ANS-Inspection time relation-
ship reported here is in contrast to the findings documented
by Halberda et al. (2008) who found that neither performance
in a rapid automatic naming task (R.A.N., Denckla and Rudel,
1976) nor visual working memory accounted for a significant
proportion of variance in ANS acuity. However, while the R.A.N.-
task requires participants to access word labels for a presented
color, and thus is not merely a perceptual task, the inspection
time task only requires a rapidly formed perceptual represen-
tation of the difference between two stimuli. The difference in
results may thus be due to differences in task demands, a pos-
sibility that should be explored in future research. DeWind and
Brannon (2012) included a line length task and reported a signif-
icant positive correlation between w for number discrimination
and w for line length discrimination. This indicates that dis-
crimination of different magnitudes could be carried out by a
common system (see also, Cohen Kadosh et al., 2008). While
the line length task in DeWind and Brannon (2012) and our
inspection time task are similar and both include lines as stim-
uli there are non-trivial differences between the tasks. In the
inspection time task the perceptual difference between the stim-
uli is highly discriminable if participants would have unlimited
presentation time, whereas this may not be the case for some
stimuli in the line length task. Thus, while the line length task
probably to a certain degree measures perceptual discrimination
ability the inspection time task is purported to measure “pure”
mental processing speed. Therefore, the correlation reported by
6Another possibility is that ANS acuity and performance on the inspection
time task are related through a common representation of magnitude, as sug-
gested by Walsh (2003) in a theory of magnitude (ATOM). See also Cohen
Kadosh et al. (2008).
DeWind and Brannon (2012) and the correlation reported here
are possibly indicative of two separate relationships between ANS
and other abilities. Further, our results suggest that some of
the observed relationship between ANS acuity and general math
achievement (e.g., Halberda et al., 2008; Mazzocco et al., 2011)
may be mediated by motivation, those more motivated in the
numerosity judgments may also have been more motivated to
perform well at math. The effect of motivation on ANS acuity
is small, however.
The lack of significant correlation between self-rated and
actual performance suggests that ANS acuity is a core ability that
lies beyond meta-cognitive monitoring7. The strong underesti-
mation of participants’ performance in the inspection time task
reveals that they find this task very hard.
Most importantly, the results of the present study show that
training on non-symbolic tasks alone does not seem in the short-
term to improve the number sense rapidly. This, in turn, suggests
that a characteristic of the number sense may be its inertia
rather than malleability, at least in adults. It remains possible,
of course, that more sustained training may result in learning.
Further, it remains possible that a critical period exists when
practice may lead to improvement. It remains to be investi-
gated if the effects of training found in children (Wilson et al.,
2006b, 2009) can be extended to tasks only including non-
symbolic comparisons and when control groups are used. Finally,
it is also possible that ANS acuity could be improved by other
means than corrective feedback on magnitude comparison judg-
ments. For example, using feedback on symbolic labeling of
non-symbolic stimuli might improve the mapping between these
kinds of representations. Future research should explore these
possibilities.
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